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The spectre of fascism currently haunts liberal democracy. This ‘keywords’ entry explores the 
expansion of Right-populism, white nationalism, 
and the alt-Right, examining the consolidation of a 
‘post-fascist constellation’. I outline a five-featured 
ideal-type of fascism, before turning to explore 
post-fascism’s utopian dimensions, drawing on 
the work of Ernst Bloch. Against liberal attempts 
to mock, pathologise, or re-educate post-fascists, 
I argue we must attend to both the multitude of 
fears and the figures of a better world expressed 
within this formation of thought.
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After the ‘end of history’ and the period of ‘happy 
globalisation’, but especially after the so-called ‘Global 
Financial Crisis’ of 2007–2009 and the attendant ‘Great 
Recession’, the spectre of fascism has been haunting the 
liberal imagination. The older confidence that fascism had 
been consigned to the dustbin of history is disappearing 
amidst a string of Right-wing populist electoral successes, 
Brexit, Trump, and an increasingly visible ‘alt-Right’ online 
culture. In August 2018 alone, the time of writing, a socialist 
bookstore in London was raided by fascist protestors, Lauren 
Southern and Stefan Molyneux arrived on our shores, and far-
Right riots occurred in eastern Germany. The contemporary 
concern about resurgent fascism is well-founded; however, it 
is poorly expressed and analysed. Following Enzo Traverso, 
I contend that today we are witnessing the consolidation 
of a ‘post-fascist constellation’, that is ‘still in mutation’. 
This constellation includes, among other forces, Right-
wing populist parties, white nationalists, and the alt-Right.1 
To unpack this emerging formation, I suggest an ideal-
typical model of fascism, explore the distinctive features 
of contemporary post-fascism, and argue it is important 
1 Enzo Traverso ‘Mutations of fascism: An interview with Enzo 
Traverso,’ interview by Olivier Doubre, trans. David Broder, Verso 
Blog, February 28, 2017, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3112-
mutations-of-fascism-an-interview-with-enzo-traverso.
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to apprehend and understand the utopian dimensions of this political-
intellectual formation. This utopian focus provides a contrast to the 
predominant liberal approaches, which are marked by psychologising, 
moral indignation, educationism, and class hatred. It also offers a more 
hopeful path, beyond attention to the very visible elements of fear and 
hatred within post-fascism.
What is fascism?
To begin with, I will outline a conceptual model of fascism. Drawing 
on work by a number of scholars of fascism and far-Right thought,2 I 
suggest an ideal-typical reading of fascism with five component parts: (i) 
organic, transcendent, palingenetic nationalism; (ii) conspiracy theorising 
and cleansing; (iii) charismatic authority; (iv) counter-revolution and 
backlash politics; and (v) militaristic masculinity. Fascism engages in a 
politics centred on the figure of an organic, integral, and pure nation or 
ethnic group. This entails hostility towards outsiders, frequently expressed 
as racism. Historically, this racism has been largely of a biological kind—
civilisation versus barbarism, racial hierarchies, Spencerian evolutionism—
2 Chip Berlet and Mathew Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close For 
Comfort (New York: Guilford Press, 2000);  Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, 
Far-Right Politics in Europe (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2017); Roger Eatwell 
‘Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism,’ Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 
(1992): 161-194; ‘On Defining the “Fascist Minimum:” The Centrality of Ideology,’ 
Journal of Political Ideologies 1, no. 3 (1996): 1–7; Roger Eatwell, ‘Explaining Fascism 
and Ethnic Cleansing: The Three Dimensions of Charisma and the Four Dark Sides 
of Nationalism,’ Political Studies Review 4 (2006): 263–278; Roger Griffin, The 
Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1991); Roger Griffin, ‘Studying Fascism in a 
Postfascist Age: From New Consensus to New Wave?’ Fascism 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–17; 
Michael Mann, Fascists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Robert Paxton, The 
Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Knopf, 2004); Dylan Riley, The Civic Foundations 
of Fascism in Europe (London: Verso, 2010); Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: 
Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011); Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence (New York: New Press, 2003); 
Enzo Traverso, ‘Interpreting Fascism: Mosse, Sternhell, and Gentile in Comparative 
Perspective,’ Constellations 15, no. 3 (2008): 303–319; Ruth Wodak, The Politics of 
Fear: What Right-Wing Populism Discourses Mean (London: Sage, 2015). 
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but it has also been expressed in cultural terms. This appeal to an organic 
and pure identity politics is viewed as the means of transcending conflict, 
disharmony, and decay. In particular, this politics is viewed as the vehicle of 
what Roger Griffin calls ‘palingenesis’: the redemption of a nation or ethnic 
group achieved through national or ethnic rebirth. This rebirth overcomes, 
in the process, decadence, betrayal, and humiliation that may have been 
suffered, for instance, through military defeat, loss of territory, economic 
decline, falling international status.3 
Fascist narratives of the past, present, and future of the nation or ethnic 
group are typically articulated in self-consciously mythic terms, and by way 
of conspiricist understandings of the present and revisionist understandings 
of the past (Holocaust denial being one instance of this today). Rather 
than being viewed as merely a series of negations such as anti-liberalism, 
anti-communism, anti-democracy, anti-Semitism, or anti-Enlightenment,4 
fascism should be viewed as both anti-systemic and revolutionary, espousing 
an alternative, ‘rooted modernity’.5 This anti-systemic element is expressed 
in conspiracy theorising. The uncovered conspiracy necessitates cleansing 
the nation of outsider Others—whether these are ethnic, religious, sexual, 
or political elements—thereby closing the political community. Conspiracy 
theorising can be understood as a way of mapping the complex patterns 
and power dynamics of the social world.6 It does this via an easily graspable, 
totalising political optic that maintains that powerful, hidden, evil forces, 
outside of the true community, control human destinies, and is frequently 
3 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism. 
4 Traverso, ‘Interpreting fascism.’
5 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism. For a number of important commentators, fascism 
is defined primarily by its negations, and by its efforts at containing social change. 
See, for instance, Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism. Indeed, in practice, fascists were 
frequently pragmatic and came to accommodations with economic, political, and 
cultural elites. Nevertheless, my argument is that there is also a set of appeals to 
another, better way of being both subjectively and socially at play within fascism. 
6 Fredric Jameson, ‘Cognitive Mapping,’ in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. 
Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 347–357. 
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bound up with apocalyptic and/or millennial beliefs.7 Frequently, such 
conspiricism draws on core tropes of historic anti-Semitism, even when 
anti-Semitism is formally renounced. This can include the following: 
opposition to immigration, cosmopolitanism, and elites in the economic, 
political, media, and academic spheres; valorisation of ‘true’ producers, 
and of commonsense and ordinary wisdom against unrooted abstraction, 
universalism, and intellectualism.8 Ideological, cultural, or biologically 
foreign elements within the nation require true members of the community 
to remain constantly vigilant, as signalled in the fascist obsession with 
security and border politics.9 
This conspiracism and its attendant border politics is bound up with 
charismatic modes of authority. The spread of fascism in Europe from 
the 1920s-1940s is widely linked to an accompanying retreat of liberal 
democracy.10 However, fascism tends to combine a certain number of 
democratic appeals—the people, the nation, participation, community, 
the nationalised masses—with a species of aristocratic elitism, condensed 
in the decisive heroism of what the proto-fascist French far-Right described 
as the ‘Magic King’, a figure both of and above the people—Hitler and 
Mussolini being the most well-recognised exemplars.11 We see, then, in 
fascism, appeals to the will of the people combined with elitist, charismatic 
7 Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary 
America (California: University of California Press, 2013); Berlet and Lyons, Right-
Wing Populism in America; Alfred Moore, ‘Conspiracy and Conspiracy Theories in 
Democratic Politics,’ Critical Review 28, no. 1 (2016): 1–23. 
8 Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America; Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence.
9 Wodak, The Politics of Fear. 
10 In 1920 there were 35 constitutional and elected governments; by 1944 this number had 
fallen to just 12. See Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, 1914–1991 (London: Abacus, 1997).
11 Nigel Copsey, ‘“Fascism . . . but with an Open Mind”: Reflections on the 
Contemporary Far Right in Western Europe,’ Fascism 2, no. 1 (2017): 1–17; Eatwell, ‘On 
Defining the “Fascist Minimum”’; ‘Explaining Fascism and Ethnic Cleansing’; Griffin, 
The Nature of Fascism; Ishay Landa, The Apprentice’s Sorcerer: Liberal Tradition and Fascism 
(Leiden: Brill, 2014); Traverso, ‘Interpreting Fascism’; Wodak, The Politics of Fear.  
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authoritarianism.12 
As suggested above, fascism should not be understood purely as a 
force of negation, as a reactionary and incoherent set of rejections and 
oppositions, or as a mere simulacrum of revolution. Nevertheless, fascism 
cannot be understood without attention to its counter-revolutionary or 
backlash politics.13 Fascism has both drawn from and fervently, obsessively 
reacted against Left political and cultural forms and figures—sometimes, 
say, appropriating dimensions of socialism while fiercely attacking 
communist and working class forms of organisation.14 
Finally, both military and gendered bodily dimensions have been 
crucial to fascism, which I characterise as ‘militaristic masculinity’. 
Traverso, for instance, has underscored the indispensable activating role of 
modern European organised violence— imperialism, factory discipline, the 
prison system, the Great War—in fascism.15 Michael Mann, meanwhile, 
emphasises that fascism is inseparable from marching, uniforms, danger, 
guns, and fighting, all of which acted to distinctively ‘encage’ young men 
in paramilitary organisations; such organisations proved vital for fascism’s 
12 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism; Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘Trump, 
Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,’ HKS 
Working Paper (2016), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/trump-brexit-and-
rise-populism-economic-have-nots-and-cultural-backlash.
13 Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism; Riley, The Civic Foundations of Fascism; Traverso, 
The Origins of Nazi Violence; Traverso, ‘Interpreting Fascism’. 
14 Marxists have tended to explain fascism by reference to class and capitalism. In 
1933, for instance, the Communist International declared that ‘Fascism is the open 
terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist 
elements of finance capital’ (quoted in Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 3). Mann rejects 
such explanations, suggesting that fascists tended to be located outside of, and were 
hostile towards both sides within, the class struggle (see Mann, Fascists). Nevertheless, 
both Germany and Italy were shaken by strong, and at points revolutionary, workers’ 
and socialist movements, and fascists engaged in class warfare. In this respect, fascist 
politics coincided with the orientations and interests of powerful elites and were 
therefore often aided into power by elites who feared revolution from the popular 
classes attached to the Left. See Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism. 
15 Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence; ‘Interpreting Fascism.’
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successes in the inter-war period.16 This paramilitary aspect was, of course, 
profoundly gendered. A deep-lying value of fascism is the appeal to what 
we would now describe as ‘toxic masculinity’—characterised in this case by 
the exaltation of battle and martial values such as strength, power, loyalty, 
speed, courage, youth, virility, action, and decisiveness.17 
I have suggested these five elements as a way of binding fascism into a 
useable concept, and acknowledging that fascism was a deeply variegated 
phenomenon historically, or, as Roger Eatwell frames it, ‘a spectral-syncretic 
ideology . . . a set of syntheses’. Fascism has oscillated, for instance, 
between a conservative view of man constrained by nature and the 
more left-wing view of the possibilities of creating a ‘new man’; between 
a commitment to science, especially in terms of understanding human 
nature, and a more anti-rationalist, vitalist interest in the possibilities of 
will . . . ; between faith and service of Christianity and the heroism of 
Classical thought; [and] between private property relations more typical of 
the right and a form of welfarism more typical of the left.18 
More widely, across fascism in the 1920s–1940s we see extraordinary 
variety—Christian and pagan, racist and tolerant (if still fervent) patriotism, 
nationalist and internationalist, leaning in Romantic and Enlightenment 
directions, statist and more market-oriented, conservative and bohemian.19 
Like Marxism and anarchism on the other side of the political spectrum, 
this intellectual formation must be seen in its forms, as a ‘panorama of 
discrepancies’, a ‘highly unstable, non-homogenous composite’.20 
16 Paramilitary groups were particularly effective at breaking up socialist and 
working class organisations and intimidating opponents, as well as generating high 
levels of solidarity and ‘brotherhood’ among fascist militants. See Mann, Fascists. 
17 Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence. 
18 Eatwell, ‘Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism,’ 189. 
19 Camus and Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe; Eatwell, ‘Towards a New 
Model of Generic Fascism’; ‘Explaining Fascism and Ethnic Cleansing’; Traverso, The 
Origins of Nazi Violence; ‘Interpreting Fascism.’
20 Paolo Favilli, The History of Italian Marxism: From its Origins to the Great War 
(Leiden: Brill, 2016), vii, 13. 
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Coordinates of post-fascism
I am suggesting that despite its variegation, what I have called post-fascism 
clearly belongs within the fascist tradition as I have conceptualised it here. 
Regarding the first feature of my ideal-type, we see in today’s post-fascism a 
return to a strong politics of the purified, integral nation, often in a rather 
classic nation-state form within the Right-populist parties (for instance, the 
French National Front or Jobbik in Hungary), and frequently in a more sub-
state or pan-European sense elsewhere.21 This revivified identitarianism or 
ethnicisation is expressed in the form of what Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas 
Lebourg call ‘sovereignism’, a drive towards, and desire for, a new politics 
of strength, power, decision, and independence.22 Such identitarianism and 
sovereignism is conjured up against narratives of cataclysmic decline—the 
so-called ‘white genocide’ narrative of the alt-Right, for instance—brought 
about by forces such as the European Union, globalism, the ‘Zionist 
Occupation Government’, Islamism, political correctness, feminism, and 
‘cultural Marxism’.23  
These forces are understood in conspiratorial terms, from ideas around 
the ‘new world order’, to 9/11 ‘inside job’ conspiracies, to ‘birther’ memes 
and beyond, the correlate of which is a politics of cleansing. Right-populist 
denunciations of ‘the establishment’—the alt-Right on the pernicious, 
ubiquitous influence of ‘cultural Marxism’, or white nationalism’s paranoia 
about the ‘new world order’—produce totalising maps of the world and 
21 See, for example, Aleksandr Dugin, ‘The Eurasist Vision,’ The Fourth Political 
Theory, 2018, accessed February 26, 2018, http://www.4pt.su/en/content/eurasist-
vision; Richard Spencer, ‘The Charlatan of Charlottesville: An Interview With 
Richard Spencer,’ interview by Hayden Daniel and Nathan Richendollar, The W & 
L Spectator, November 14, 2017, http://www.wluspectator.com/home/2017/11/14/
the-charlatan-of-charlottesville-an-interview-with-richard-spencer; Alain De Benoit 
and Charles Champetier, ‘Manifesto of the French New Right in Year 2000,’ New 
European Conservative, 1999, 2017, https://neweuropeanconservative.files.wordpress.
com/2012/10/manifesto-of-the-french-new-right1.pdf.
22 Camus and Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe.
23 This last term is a catch-all, with elective affinities to the Nazi notion of ‘cultural 
Bolshevism’, used to refer to social justice-oriented thought such as critical theory, 
multiculturalism, feminism, LGBT+ activism, and so on. It is also a central concern of 
the extremely popular ‘soft’ post-fascist Master-figure of Jordan Peterson.
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of power.24 The means for cleansing the nation of elite distortions—such 
as ‘big government’, ‘big media’, or ‘big Hollywood’ in Breitbart’s terms—
or privileged ethnic minorities may assume a number of forms. Frequent 
among them are the purging of institutions, such as Leftist academia or 
the media; expelling foreign elements, especially Muslim immigrants; 
the exposure and de-protection of ‘privileged’ ethnic groups, as seen in 
arguments about African-American crime among US white nationalist 
groups; and separatism expressed in the desire for a white ethno-state. 
Naturally, post-fascism operates on a different terrain from that of the 
historical fascism of the 1920s-1940s. This earlier period was characterised, 
notably, by ‘landslide crisis’—the trauma of the First World War, the 
difficult transition to liberal democratic political forms, the Russian 
Bolshevik revolution of 1917, and the very real possibility of further 
communist successes across Europe.25 One significant novelty today is the 
almost universally high esteem in which democracy is held. Ostensible 
democracy is, then, a consistent component of post-fascism. Especially 
visible is a new-media democratic populism, which embraces supposedly 
free and direct communication, outside of establishment channels, and 
attached to scandal politics, celebrity, participation, obscene scapegoating 
and denial, and appeals to strong, decisive leadership.26 Something akin to 
the French New Right’s notion of ‘organic democracy’ is combined with an 
elite politics of decision, action, and heroic masculinity. Donald Trump’s 
presidency has so far exemplified these features, perhaps to the point of 
caricature.  
Just as classical fascism both plagiarised and fervently opposed the 
Left, so post-fascism, on the one hand, borrows certain Leftist elements, 
particularly the New Left appeal to the recognition and valorisation of 
the ‘right to difference’,27 a certain irreverence and libidinal appeal to 
transgression (often manifest in obscene refutations of ‘politically correct’ 
24 See, for instance, the site Stormfront, https://www.stormfront.org/forum/index.
php.
25 Mann, Fascists; Tom Nairn, ‘Reflections on Nationalist Disasters,’ New Left 
Review I/230 (1998): 145–152; Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism. 
26 Wodak, The Politics of Fear. 
27 Copsey, ‘Fascism . . . but with an Open Mind.’ 
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culture),28 a politics of the ordinary people against elites, and the notion of 
transformational consciousness raising (for instance, the obsession with free 
speech and with ‘red-pilling’, a term borrowed from the science fiction film 
The Matrix, within the alt-Right). On the other hand, a politics of backlash 
or restoration is also constitutive, something visible in the crucial role 
played by the opposition to ‘cultural Marxism’ within alt-Right and white 
nationalist circles, for instance. On this note, Simon Bornschier views Right-
populism as something of a delayed reaction to the slowly unfolding results 
of the radical 1960s,29 the progressive discrediting of explicit and public 
sexism, racism, and homophobia in around a third of the world’s nations.30 
This backlash is frequently expressed in terms of opposition to ‘political 
correctness’, ‘social justice warriors’, multiculturalists, and feminists, and 
has more recently taken the form of violent street encounters with anti-
fascist demonstrators, perhaps most prominently in Charlottesville in 
August 2017.
This brings us, finally, to militaristic masculinity. Active paramilitary 
elements are not common across post-fascism, although Jobbik in Hungary, 
the American militia revival (The Three Percenters, for instance), or Golden 
Dawn in Greece provide exceptions.31 However, a militaristic masculinity 
is clearly visible across post-fascism as a whole. This is expressed, as it 
was historically within 1920s–1940s fascism, in a contradictory mixture 
of protection, idealisation, and marginalisation of women, as well as overt 
sexual aggression towards them. We find, too, various efforts towards the 
re-regulation of women’s bodies in so-called ‘sex realism’, biologically 
determinist rejections of trans identities, and the declaration that ‘feminism is 
cancer’ within the alt-Right, anti-abortion stances in Christian-oriented post-
fascism, and the opposition to the hijab or veil (often in the name of women’s 
28 Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars From 4Chan to Tumblr to 
Trump and the Alt-Right (Winchester: Zero Books, 2017). 
29 Simon Bornschier, Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural 
Conflict in Western Europe (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010).
30 Göran Therborn, The World: A Beginner’s Guide (Cambridge: Polity, 2011). 
31 For more on the longer history of the US militia movement, see Berlet and 
Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America; also, David Neiwert, Alt-America: The Rise of 
the Radical Right in the Age of Trump (London: Verso, 2017). 
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liberation) across much Right-populism. In alt-Right and white nationalist 
circles, in particular—from 4Chan, to ‘gamergate’, to pick-up artistry and 
the resentments of Incels, to an unleashed violent pornographic trolling 
culture of rape and death threats—we glimpse an emergent online cultural 
form: the so-called ‘manosphere’ (see Figure 1). Opposed to the feminising 
and ‘gaying’ of national cultures (condensed in the disdainful deployment of 
the term ‘snowflake’), revelling in the circulation of pornographically violent 
images and virtual gaming imaginaries of battle, and a ‘passion for the real’.32 
 
Figure 1. The Manosphere.33
This increasingly inescapable, vulgar, and depressing sub-culture is brimming 
with resonances with the ideal of the new man of classical fascism.
While we can find multiple connections linking the fascism of 
the 1920s–1940s to post-fascism, such as economic crisis, political 
32 Alain Badiou uses this phrase to refer to the 20th Century search, in politics and 
art, for authenticity, transparency, depth, and immediacy. See Alain Badiou, The Century 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2008).
33 From https://shotgunwildatheart.wordpress.com/2014/10/02/shotgun-vs-the-
man-o-sphere/.
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disorientation, and intellectual turmoil,34 there are perhaps a number 
of shifts and discrepancies too. Chief among these are different core 
constituencies, the absence of strong Leftist mass movements today, and 
different orientations towards the state. Our current moment, marked 
by the dislocations of neoliberal globalisation, technocratic politics, class 
reconfigurations, and a new spirit of capitalism,35 is quite other to the ‘first 
crisis of modernity’ that shaped the rise and success of inter-war fascism.36 
Post-fascism is not a simple return of the fascism of the 1920s–1940s. 
Rather, while versions of the ideal-typical fascist elements I have suggested 
are to be found within post-fascism, post-fascism is composed of distinctive 
emphases and is multi-stranded; in the same way that contemporary 
anarchism and Marxism are multi-stranded and both continuous yet 
iterative variations upon their 19th and 20th century antecedents.
Post-fascism and utopia
As noted earlier, I believe it is important, both analytically and strategically, to 
focus on the utopian dimensions of post-fascism. Beyond scattered mentions 
of, say, the desire for a ‘white ethno-state’, obsessive ‘identitarianism’, or the 
promise of the ‘manosphere’, analysis of post-fascism has so far neglected 
this dimension. Looming larger have been those fearful and hateful 
elements expressed within this peculiar political-intellectual formation. In 
Ruth Wodak’s reading, for instance, Right-populism is centred around a 
multitude of fears, such as unemployment, strangers, national autonomy, 
the decline of older traditions and values, climate change, inequality, crime, 
and so on, which are all increasingly apparent amidst the dislocation, 
disenchantment, and alienation of many people.37 This theme is also key 
34 Peter Wagner, A History and Theory of the Social Sciences (London: Sage, 2001); 
Peter Wagner, Theorizing Modernity (London: Sage, 2001). 
35 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello suggest that the capitalism that emerged 
following the 1970s incorporated elements of the Leftist ‘artistic critique’, and has 
embraced, particularly in the Anglo-American nations, an ethos of difference, freedom, 
experimentation, continual remaking, individual desire, and so on. See Luc Boltanski 
and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism (London: Verso, 2005). 
36 Wagner, A History and Theory of the Social Sciences; Wagner, Theorizing Modernity. 
37 Wodak, The Politics of Fear. 
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in Traverso’s work on 1920s–1940s fascism, where the shattering impact of 
the First World War and the shock of the Bolshevik Revolution created a 
climate where fear came to suffuse the European collective unconscious, a 
fear associated with outsiders such as Jews, homosexuals, Roma, women, 
and Slavs; a fear to be conquered by the new man of fascism.38 This fear, 
Traverso suggests, was expressed in poignant form in Heinrich Hoffman’s 
famous portraits of Hitler rehearsing his speeches (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Heinrich Hoffman’s photographs of Hitler 
rehearsing his speeches (1927).39
Hitler’s gestures and expressions, in fact, conjure up the very opposite of 
the aimed-for unshakeable strength and unbending aggression. 
Such fears are clearly an essential feature of fascism, both old and 
new, but equally important are those neglected utopian features operating 
within post-fascism. Here, I follow Ruth Levitas’s wide-ranging definition 
of utopia as the desire for a better way of being. This makes utopia a 
38 Enzo Traverso, Fire and Blood: The European Civil War, 1914–1945 (London: Verso, 2016). 
39 Available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_102-
10460,_Adolf_Hitler,_ Rednerposen.jpg.
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rather ordinary and ubiquitous thing, to be found in day-dreaming, social 
movements, political life, and popular culture.40 Levitas draws heavily on 
the work of Ernst Bloch, who understood the future-oriented dimension 
of thought and action captured in his term the ‘Not-Yet’, to be ‘a basic 
determination within objective reality as a whole’, a ‘directing act’, and a 
‘component of reality itself ’. 41 In Heritage of Our Times, an important and 
neglected book composed through the 1920s and 1930s, Bloch explores 
the significance of utopianism in fascism. Depicting fascism as a ‘powerful 
cultural synthesis’,42 Bloch sharply criticises the orthodox Marxist response 
to fascism, rejecting ‘pedagogical intellectualism’, the notion that ‘truth 
makes its own way in the world’,43 and the mere denunciation of fascist 
ideology as false, irrational, nihilistic, confused, or as simply a tool of big 
business. Fascism, says Bloch, can be viewed as a ‘swindle of fulfilment’,44 
certainly, but it is not just ‘dogs and false magicians’,45 not just morbid 
symptoms, and it requires close analysis, theoretical recalibration, and the 
development of an alternate theology, a ‘religion without lies’.46 
Bloch deploys the concept of ‘non-contemporaneity’, a concept that 
expresses the idea that ‘not all people exist in the same Now’, that there 
exist among people alternate realities, shaped by people’s different material 
conditions.47 Bloch’s argument is that fascism draws from ‘the future in the 
past’,48 calling up ‘earlier forces, from quite a different Below’. It responds to 
modern disenchantment, joining a romantic anti-capitalism found among 
rural strata—roots, soil, homeland—with fears of decline and genuine 
impoverishment among middling urban strata and a youth out of step 
40 Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (London: Philip Allan, 1990). 
41 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Volume 1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 7, 12, 197.
42 In Anson Rabinbach, ‘Unclaimed Heritage: Ernst Bloch’s Heritage of Our Times 
and the Theory of Fascism,’ New German Critique 11 (1977): 5.
43 Rabinbach, ‘Unclaimed Heritage,’ 19. 
44 Rabinbach, ‘Unclaimed Heritage,’ 8. 
45 Ernst Bloch, Heritage of Our Times (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 2. 
46 Bloch, Heritage of Our Times, 144. 
47 Ernst Bloch, ‘Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to its Dialectics,’ New 
German Critique 11 (1977): 22.  
48 In Rabinbach, ‘Unclaimed Heritage,’ 7. 
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with ‘the barren Now’.49 Fascism, then, expresses an authentic longing for 
something different, locating this difference in a mythical and lost past. It 
successfully steals elements from the Left such as the colour red, the street, 
and the language of revolutionary change.50 And it creates ‘new figures’,51 
synthesising various elements into ‘hybrid structures’, using ‘hooks’ from 
elsewhere (such as fairy-tales, myth, kitsch, Romanticism, occultism, and 
magic), ‘masculine qualities’ (strength, openness, decency, and purity), a 
primitive-atavistic ‘participation mystique’, as well as vitalist philosophy 
(will, life, creation, archaic surging, and instinctive knowledge).52
Bloch’s utopian optic provides a much needed supplement in 
approaching post-fascism, especially as psychological and cultural portraits 
abound in the literature.53 At times, such portraits, particularly those within 
liberal media, have their own obscene underside—class hatred towards the 
poor in depictions of the ‘white trash’ hoards rallying to Brexit, Trump, or the 
far-Right. Certainly, in line with Bloch, Right-populist forces have gained 
traction in Western rust-belts and smaller de-industrialised towns, where 
a class element intertwines with ethnic, gender, and generational factors. 
Here, we frequently find post-fascist appeals to a return of ‘manufacturing’, 
‘re-industrialisation’ (for instance, the French Front National), expanded 
employment, the protection of local industry, the ‘revival of national 
product’, the control of financial markets, and the re-invigoration of an 
exclusivist welfare state.54 However, another class dimension involves that 
49 Bloch, ‘Nonsynchronism,’ 22, 23.
50 Bloch, Heritage of Our Times, 64. 
51 Bloch, Heritage of Our Times, 3. 
52 Bloch, ‘Nonsynchronism’, 32; Bloch, Heritage of Our Times. 
53 See, for instance, Niewert, Alt-America. 
54 See, for example: CasaPound, ‘CasaPound Italia Platform,’ 2018, http://www.
casapounditalia.org/p/who-are-we.html; de Benoit and Champetier, ‘Manifesto 
of the French New Right’; Dugin, ‘Eurasist Vision’; Greg Johnson, ‘Whitopia’, 
Counter-Currents Publishing, 2018, http://www.counter-currents.com/2018/01/
whitopia/; Spencer, ‘Charlatan of Charlottesville’; Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), 
‘Party Programme,’ Freedom Party of Austria, 2011, https://www.fpoe.at/themen/
parteiprogramm/parteiprogramm-englisch/; Alternative For Germany, Manifesto For 
Germany: The Political Programme of the Alternative For Germany, 2016,  https://www.
afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/04/2017-04-12afd-grundsatzprogramm-
englischweb.pdf.
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constituency often identified in Marxian analyses of fascism—the petty 
bourgeoisie, threatened with downward mobility after the Global Financial 
Crisis and Great Recession, as argued by Ingelhart and Norris55 and by 
other commentators on the alt-Right.56 Along these lines, we see attention 
frequently given to bolstering small and medium enterprises, the protection 
of farming and the open, green spaces of homeland, and unleashed creativity 
and diversity. Further illustrating the relevance of Bloch’s work, across 
post-fascism we find an abundance of idealised imagery conjuring the past: 
Sparta, the Roman Empire, Crusader kings, Nazi rallies, the consensual 
and prosperous 1950s, and the supposedly more certain white masculinity 
of the 1980s embodied in action films or video-game iconography from 
this period (and especially associated with fashwave music).57
In approaching the cultural surpluses, the conjuring of earlier forces, 
and the ‘hybrid structures’ composited by post-fascism, a Master-figure is 
gathered in the appeal to and drive for something like a more sure period 
of homogeneous, organised capitalism that enshrined white male privilege. 
Layered onto this are representations close in content to some of those 
deployed in classical fascism, with occult and pagan elements, intoxicating 
imagery from martial antiquity, and a new vitalism of creative destruction, 
will, decision, brotherhood, and surging life. This cannot, however, be 
viewed as a straightforward return or a pure traditionalism. Not only do 
we see the conjoining of very different figures from the past, but also the 
gathering of a variety of new figurations. These include contentions about 
the need for new supra-state formations, for instance, ‘great spaces’ or ‘geo-
economic belts’;58 religious pluralism;59 environmentalism;60 multi-polarity, 
55 Ingelhart and Norris, ‘Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism.’ 
56 George Hawley, Making Sense of the Alt-Right (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2017). 
57 Annie Kelly, ‘The Alt-Right: Reactionary Rehabilitation for White Masculinity,’ 
Soundings 66 (2017): 68–78. 
58 Dugin, ‘Eurasist Vision.’ 
59 Johnson, ‘Whitopia.’
60 CasaPound, ‘CasaPound Italia Platform’; de Benoit and Champetier, ‘Manifesto 
of the French New Right.’
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a ‘pluriverse’, ‘differentialist anti-racism’;61 a new European homeland that 
goes beyond nation states, and takes a benevolent imperial form;62 and 
‘Total computerisation’.63 
In fascism’s heroic period, this syncretic quality is captured well by 
Goebbels’s phrase ‘steel romanticism’; today, we find something similar in 
Richard Spencer’s remark that ‘If the alt-Right were in power, we would all 
have arrived here via magnetic levitation trains . . . We would have passed 
by great forests and beautiful images of blond women in a wheat field with 
their hands, running them through the wheat [sic]’.64 In Table 1, I have 
attempted to capture some of this. Schematically modifying Traverso’s 
tabulation, I indicate major utopian and dystopian figures populating the 
post-fascist landscape.
Faced with the coming into being of a post-fascist constellation, 
liberals, and many from the Left, have tended to take one of three paths: 
first, a consensual liberalism that seeks to mock, discredit, pathologise, 
and dehumanise post-fascists, partly for their failure to acknowledge 
the present and supposedly still self-evident ‘end of history’; second, a 
patient educationism that focuses on rational refutation of untruthful and 
irrational post-fascist contentions, thereby missing much of the ‘magic’ 
animating post-fascism; or, third, a more confrontational anti-fascism, 
which sees no other option than to fight fire with fire. Each of these paths 
relies, in line with Bloch’s strictures, on its own implicit, hidden utopian 
and dystopian figures. Humour, ideology critique, and meditation on the 
question of violence are likely to be important features of the battle against 
post-fascism, whose threat cannot be underestimated. 
These tasks, however, should be supplemented by another course: the 
attempt to extract and illuminate the dream elements and utopian surpluses 
of this emerging post-fascist constellation. This is partly a question of 
developing a guiding ethos, in the spirit of what Bloch called a ‘critical-
61 De Benoit and Champetier, ‘Manifesto of the French New Right.’
62 Spencer, ‘Charlatan of Charlottesville.’ 
63 CasaPound, ‘CasaPound Italia Platform.’ 
64 In Pema Levy, ‘Alt-Right Movement Presents its Vision for an All-White Society 
with Trump Leading the Way,’ Mother Jones, September 9, 2016, https://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2016/09/alt-right-makes-its-main-stream-debut/
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Utopian
Spirit, concreteness, wisdom, 
experience, tradition, decision
Soil, nation
Honour
Myth 
Community
Creation
Hero
 
Loyalty
Hierarchy
Legitimacy
Nature
Authority
Organic integrity, oneness
Realism—race and sex
 
Masculinity
 
Action
Regeneration, rebirth
Combat
Body
Leader
Charisma
The ethnic people
Purity
Dystopian
Abstract reason, universalism
 
Rootlessness, cosmopolitanism
Utilitarianism
Rationalism, science, expertise
Individuality
Standardisation
Financial elites, bureaucrats, 
academics
Contract
Equality
Law
Humanity
Democracy
Pluralism
Political correctness, 
cultural Marxism
Feminisation, the ‘gaying’ 
of culture
Passivity
Degeneration, decadence
Pacifism 
Mind
Citizen
Rational-legal authority
Establishment, abstract humanity
Hybridity, engineered mixing
Table 1. Utopian and dystopian significations in post-fascism  
(adapted from Traverso).65
                     65 Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, 135-136, 142-143. 
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militant optimism’, that allows us to productively engage with people 
holding to even the most apparently repulsive ideologies, interpreting their 
ideas as always more than refuse and rubbish, and which is attuned to those 
aforementioned elements of class hatred operative in liberal media.66 It is 
also an intellectual-strategic step towards what Bloch imagined could be a 
re-drawing and re-purposing of these utopian elements by an emancipatory 
theory and practice. We must be careful, as Bloch warns, not to surrender 
the grounds of heaven and hell, the terrain of myth, religion, spirit, and 
emotion, grounds upon which fascists speak deceitfully but to people, 
while those on the Left speak truly but only of things.67
           
66 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 446. 
67 Bloch, Heritage of Our Times, 138. 
